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Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law. By Douglas W.
Amer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. 344. Price:
$37.99 (Paperback). Reviewed by Peter Liem.
Adam Smith assumed that, even when it meant less profit, "every
individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can," where
"[hje can know better the character and situation of the persons whom he
trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of the
country from which he must seek redress."
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Whether or not Smith's assumptions were correct at the time, now
investors will go wherever profit is to be had. Yet the dangers of overseas
investment, to which Smith pointed, still remain today. Douglas Amer's new
book addresses the current international and global mechanisms designed to
mitigate the dangers about which Smith warned. Starting with the financial
crises of the 1990s in Latin America and Asia, Amer discusses the goals the
financial world set for itself and the adjustments it made to the prior
international system of finance in order to increase and stabilize transnational
investment flows.
Unfortunately for the reader, Amer's book awkwardly straddles a line
between a textbook and a meaningful policy recommendation, with the latter
winning over the former because of Amer's diffuse presentation of his main
themes. Although he sets out to argue that law (including associated
institutional frameworks) is a key foundation for economic development and
that an "effective" financial sector is important for economic growth, Amer
makes neither argument persuasively. Substantial parts of the book are simply
dedicated to reporting the ongoing work of the world's financial policy
agenda-setters, sometimes in relatively intricate detail. While this may be
useful for anyone interested in the precise workings of, say, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), it takes away from the substance of Amer's main
claims. Arner provides what could be a useful text for a course on
international financial development, but a poor defense for the position that
the financial industry as we know it is necessary or even good for economic
development.
Amer describes the various international finance regulators striving for
two things: transparency and consistency. The detailed description of the role
of law in building, maintaining, and strengthening investor confidence
through transparency and consistency presents a strong factual case for the
importance of rule of law in preventing financial crises and for promoting
economic development. Amer is much less persuasive, however, when he
tries to make the normative case for the importance of rule of law in the
context of global and transnational finance. For example, Amer speculates
that the need for financial regulatory law and strong institutions was "not
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given significant attention in emerging, transition, and developing economies
until the mid 1990s, largely because they existed already in the developed
economies and hence were often ignored or assumed in the context of
financial research looking to the developed country context" (p. 92).
However, the relevant consideration should be what the now-developed
countries did while they were in developing stages, as the legal and
institutional frameworks present then were often significantly different than
they are today.
Amer also discusses some of the less-discussed legal structures needed
to support a stable financial sector, such as strong intellectual property rights.
He aims to provide a strong argument for the need for a sophisticated and
adequately planned legal infrastructure for development to take place.
However, here the discussion is lacking in depth. For example, it is
questionable whether developing countries should have strong intellectual
property protections, given that many developed countries flouted patent laws
to develop domestic industries using the very latest in foreign technology.
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Many of the discussions throughout the book suffer from a similar failure to
address rather obvious counterexamples to the notion that a particular legal
framework is going to promote development.
Amer is modest in his recommendations for how best to strengthen
financial stability globally. He limits himself to comments on studies and
reports from agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, and either
endorses them wholesale or just slightly modifies their conclusions. His
broadest recommendations come in the form of his approval of developing
global systems for regulating finance. He suggests that the Bretton Woods
system needs to be readdressed in an effort to mitigate the dangers of national
financial crises spreading to the international level (p. 336). His careful and
dctailed discussions leading up to this idea make for his best argument,
although the mass of detail without structure is an impediment that prevents
Amer from being fully persuasive.
Undoubtedly, financial stability is to be preferred over the threat of
financial crisis, but the easiest path to stability is to shut financial markets
down altogether. Amer consistently points out that "integration into the
financial system is not without dangers and must be based on coherent
sequencing of liberalization preceded by the development of an effectively
functioning financial system in each country as a necessary first stage" (p.
303). A question naturally arises: why should we aim to introduce or expand
financial markets in developing countries? The reader may be frustrated by
the lack of an answer to the question of whether or not high finance is actually
good for development. Amer devotes two chapters of his book to this
question, but he never answers it adequately. It is not a given that the
development of a sophisticated financial industry improves life in developing
countries. Amer does mention China as a positive example, but China has
been extremely careful in its regulation of finance, and it continues to strictly
regulate foreign investment in Chinese banks to this day. The facts of China
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do not support the notion that anything other than a tightly controlled financial
sector is good for economic growth.
Part of the problem may be that Amer fails to distinguish adequately
between the interests of investors and those of the general population. The
groups have little significant overlap, especially when it comes to
international investors and average citizens. Amer flags this problem
immediately when he notes that "economic development" is a contested term
(p. 13). This is surely a familiar point to anyone acquainted with the
controversy as to who benefits from the policies of the Washington
Consensus, but Amer lets the matter drop with only sparse mention in the rest
of the book. For instance, in his first discussion of company law, Amer off-
handedly equates advancing corporate development with advancing economic
development, but does not explain why these two are one and the same (p.
116).
In any discussion of economic development, the question of who
benefits must always be at the fore. A greater sensitivity on Amer's part as to
how particular legal and institutional structures benefit or harm different
groups of people would have made for a much more useful volume.
The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America
Helped Save Europe. By Greg Behrman. New York: Free Press, 2007.
Pp. 448. Price: $27.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Marisa B. Van
Saanen.
The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When
America Helped Save Europe is a rich narrative detailing the creation of the
Marshall Plan in the wake of the Second World War. Author Greg Behrman,
who describes his book as the first narrative history of the Marshall Plan,
depicts in unsparing detail the personalities, actors, and historical forces that
produced what is arguably the greatest foreign aid success story in history.
The book is largely sympathetic and celebratory in tone, uncritical of its
characters and descriptive perhaps to a fault. But it is an intimate and detailed
portrait of the political figures that created the Marshall Plan.
The story is timely, released amid war and reconstruction in Iraq, and
deep debates about the future of development aid and the role of the United
States in international relations. It also comes at a time when the Marshall
Plan is often referred to nostalgically as an example of when the United States
got foreign policy right. The book seems meant to inspire and invite another
Marshall Plan-like venture, with Americans taking the lead in enacting a
foreign policy that reconstructs, renews, and helps unite the world.
"Perhaps it is worth remembering," Behrman writes, "a time when extraordinary men
summoned their vast talents, wisdom and creative potential to design and execute a plan
with a transcendent aim; when America's foreign policy was defined, at once, by its
strategic interests and the very best of it ideals, when Americans were infused with a
shared sense of mission and purpose-so much so that it roused the national spirit and
elevated America's own conception about what it could accomplish, what it could be"
(pp. 341-42).
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The portrait Behrman draws of the creation of the Marshall Plan is one
of admirable and visionary statesmen, disciplined, yet compassionate, strong
as well as perceptive and responsive to the dire situation facing the devastated
post-World War II Europe. Behrman tells the story of the four-year, thirteen
billion dollar program (more than one hundred billion in today's dollars)
through the personal and professional stories and roles of George C. Marshall,
Will Clayton, Arthur Vandenburg, Paul Hoffman, Richard Bissell, and W.
Averill Harriman. Marshall, most notably, is painted not only as a figurehead
of the Marshall Plan, as in some historical accounts, but also as an engaged
and insightful decisionmaker at the center of plans to renew and rebuild
Europe.
The prologue takes readers to Cambridge, Massachusetts on June 5,
1947, to Harvard University's 286th Commencement and what Behrman
describes as, "the first 'fully normal"' graduation ceremony since the United
States entered the Second World War, five and one-half years earlier (p. 1).
On that day, the newly appointed Secretary of State, General George C.
Marshall announced that America was ready to stand with Europe in its
rebuilding. To an unsuspecting audience, he delivered a speech setting out the
preliminary framework for the plan that would eventually bear his name.
Marshall's speech was an invitation to Europe to request support from the
United States-"the initiative, I think, must come from Europe," he said. (p.
69). The idea was that the United States would pledge financial support and
partnership with Europe, but leave Europe in "control of its own destiny" (p.
69). At the end of his speech, Marshall spoke freely, looking finally to his
audience: "We are remote from the scene of these troubles .... Yet the whole
world's future hangs on a proper judgment ... of just what ... can best be
done, what must be done" (p. 70).
From this starting point, the book goes on to describe, in vivid detail, the
negotiations in Washington and Europe that led to the Marshall Plan. Most of
the book is devoted to detailing these negotiations and describing the larger
political and economic forces reverberating in a world devastated by war. The
author describes the Marshall Plan both as a force meant to stave off
communism's further spread in Europe and as a political and economic
gesture that helped inspire European integration and economic cooperation;
later, it was seen to have inspired the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and other international development efforts. "Offered in humility as a
hand in partnership, it sought nothing less than to refashion Europe in
fundamental and audacious ways" (p. 5). The book focuses both on this
idealism and the strategic goals and interests it served, including financing
some of the first covert intelligence operations in Europe and helping,
perhaps, to create a world ripe for the Cold War.
The book's only substantial weakness is that it tells only the American
side of the Marshall Plan. Behrman is quite explicit that he aimed to write the
American perspective, but this one-sidedness makes for an incomplete
account. The way the Americans diplomats are described seems overly
congratulatory and the subtitle, "The Marshall Plan and the Time When
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America Helped Save Europe," might be read as a bit patronizing by non-
Americans.
Another weakness is that the stories of the American diplomats are
engaging but sometimes too detailed and drawn out. We learn of Marshall's
hazing at the Virginia Military Institute where his classmates learned of his
courage by forcing him to squat, until he eventually fainted, over an
unsheathed bayonet. We learn that Clayton abstained from alcohol until the
age of 58, when his son, a doctor, encouraged him to drink sherry for his
health, and that Harriman, with his "slicked jet-black hair and black eyes,"
attracted a "bevy of women admirers" (p.191). All of this seems a bit
unnecessary and detracts from the seriousness of the tone.
All that said, the book does shed considerable light on the people
involved in the creation of the Marshall Plan and provides a comprehensive
account of the ways that individuals helped shape foreign policy that changed
the world. In a world at war again today, this book holds lessons for all of us.
Islands of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed Rivalries. By Gabriella
Blum. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp. 277. Price:
$49.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Karen Grohman.
Gabriella Blum's Islands of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed
Conflict develops and explores the intriguing premise that the traditional
dichotomy between war and peace should be abandoned in favor of
recognizing that stable areas of interaction exist between many states engaged
in protracted armed rivalries. According to Blum, these "islands of
agreement," which include such disparate phenomena as transnational bus
lines and temporary ceasefire agreements, have the potential to foster peace by
allowing belligerents to reach agreements in areas unrelated to the source of
the rivalry, without compromising their positions on their central disputes.
Blum puts this premise to the test in examining "islands of agreement"
in three "enduring armed rivalries" that have defied all attempts at resolution.
These are the long-running conflicts between India and Pakistan, Greece and
Turkey, and Israel and Lebanon. Blum argues that arbitrators should seek to
"manage" these conflicts, rather than solely looking to "resolve" them (p. 17)
by adopting strategies and decisions that aim to limit their scope and effects.
Unfortunately, Blum never makes clear what exactly the goals of
conflict management should be. Should countries focus on reducing civilian
casualties, encouraging cultural exchanges, sustaining economic growth, or
perhaps developing regional solidarity? Her studies of the three conflicts
illustrate all of the above, but the work would be improved by a clearer set of
specific initiatives for which conflict managers-either domestic or
international-should aim. The other tension in her work, which she
acknowledges and addresses at length, is that her approach may actually
prevent a permanent settlement of fundamental disputes by resulting in a
"universal affirmation" of them (p. 46). This tension in fact threatens her
entire thesis: if these disputes are accepted as the status quo, what is to
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encourage countries presently at war to settle their conflicts through the
accepted mechanisms of compromise, arbitration, or third-party resolution?
Blum's analysis correctly notes that, in her case studies, such mechanisms
have thus far been unsuccessful in achieving their aim of peace. Is this,
however, reason enough to abandon them entirely and let the fundamental
casus belli rest unchallenged? Blum's work cannot affirmatively answer this
question.
Blum begins by analyzing India and Pakistan, whose rivalry dates from
the partition of British India in 1947. Although the fundamental conflict
regarding Kashmir remains intractable, Blum identifies several longstanding
islands of agreement such as water usage rights, the implementation of wide-
ranging intercultural initiatives, and resolutions on issues ranging from
airspace regulations to cross-border bus travel. Blum admits these islands of
agreement are not pervasive and notes a few examples of discord in areas
separate from the border conflict. For example, Pakistan remains opposed to
allowing free trade with India.
Blum's thesis is weakened, however, because she offers no evidence that
these islands have allowed an overall normalization of relations between the
two countries. Nor does she address the fundamental problem of potential for
nuclear war. No matter how many bus lines facilitate the transfer of people
from one section of Kashmir to the other, the possibility remains for the use of
weapons of mass destruction in the face of a perceived threat to the national
security of each country. Blum's proposed islands speak to a less urgent threat
by prioritizing cultural normalization and do not address the fundamental
issue that is of the most concern.
Blum next examines Greece and Turkey, whose disagreements arise
over maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea and the status of the divided
island of Cyprus. She argues that islands of agreement established outside
these areas of conflict have been significant enough to produce what amounts
to normal relations despite the ongoing core disputes. This case differs from
the others in that these islands of agreement have expanded to encompass
almost all of the interactions between the two states, leaving Greece and
Turkey in a state no longer resembling war. Though each still participates in
military exercises designed as a warning to the other, their economic and
diplomatic relationship is stable. Greece has withdrawn all of its objections to
Turkey's membership in the European Union and Cyprus is already a member
state.
Blum notes a few areas that are still problematic-such as school
curricula in each country that continues to casts the other in the role of the
"enemy"--but on balance, the two states have come to enjoy stable relations.
This seems to be the best result that her version of conflict management can
accomplish.
In her third study, Blum turns to far thornier terrain: the conflict between
Israel and Lebanon. Unlike the other two studies, she finds only one island of
agreement: the 1996 Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding. The
Understanding established rules of engagement designed to protect civilians in
southern Lebanon during the Israeli occupation. Blum argues that this
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agreement succeeded far longer than expected because it limited itself to
protecting civilians rather than aiming to end the conflict, and that where it
was too far-reaching, it may have actually exacerbated the conflict.
The Israeli-Lebanese Understanding is useful both in its application to
the specific conflict and its implications for Blum's overall theory. Because it
went further than was practical in attempting to protect civilians-for
example, barring fighting within a certain distance of residences practically
amounted to outlawing the guerilla war (p. 248)-the Understanding
eventually collapsed. The lesson is that plans that aim to end the conflict and
address fundamental disputes accomplish less than narrow islands of
agreement that do not overreach. This is strong evidence for the workability of
her theory as applied to real conflicts.
One difficulty with the work is its dismissive treatment of the
involvement' of the international community and its potential role in
implementing the approach she favors. Blum's analyses focus primarily on
domestic arrangements and solutions, such as bilateral agreements and
internal modes of enforcement among the parties concerned. Blum's position
is based on traditional state concerns over sovereignty that make them
reluctant to submit to third-party tribunals, as well as the occasional
inapplicability of international rules to specific contexts. Yet international
standards and review could provide another framework for managing these
conflicts. For instance, international legal standards and the involvement of
the international community helped shape islands of agreement between India
and Pakistan. Similarly, France and the United States played a major role in
sustaining the Israeli-Lebanon Understanding. Thus, rather than aiming her
argument solely at scholars and domestic politicians, Blum would also do well
to appeal to international actors capable of shifting to a global focus on
"management" where appropriate.
Overall, Blum's analysis is informed, scholarly, and persuasive. Her
study ultimately meets its goal of articulating "the rich, often untapped
potential of interstate relationships" (p. 267). Her work can guide politicians
seeking to manage conflicts, rather than laboring in vain trying to end them. In
the end, although islands of agreement will not yield a "dramatic change over
the core conflict" (p. 268) or create a complete peace in the traditional sense,
Blum demonstrates how significant opportunities lie at the margins to reduce
the scale-if not the scope-of core conflicts.
The J Curve.- A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall. By Ian
Bremmer. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007. Pp. 323. Price: $15.00
(Paperback). Reviewed by Scott R. Anderson.
The word "parsimony" generally has a negative connotation. But since
Kenneth Waltz first reduced international relations to a simple collision of
billiard balls, some writers on global politics have come to see it as more of a
virtue. They argue that paring theories down to their essential variables and
causal links makes them more readily comprehensible. As a result,
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parsimonious theories find broader audiences and better reach the ears of
public figures too busy for the detail-heavy work of conventional academics.
Few authors have employed this strategy more effectively than Ian
Bremmer in his most recent work, The J Curve: A New Way to Understand
Why Nations Rise and Fall. From a simple visual model, Bremmer extracts
surprisingly complex prescriptions for a number of pressing international
problems. But the same simplicity that has made his book a popular sensation
also lends it some significant shortcomings.
The book centers on a two-dimensional graph with political stability on
the vertical axis and openness-representing the free flow of goods and
ideas-on the horizontal. Correlating the two results in the book's namesake
curve, declining steeply from the left to its nadir before beginning a gradual
climb upward and to the right. For each state, this J curve represents the
potential range of its political development: from a stable but closed autocracy
to a developed, open state. Every country has a unique J curve depending on
its specific historical, cultural, and economic circumstances, and these curves
shift vertically in response to external shocks and windfalls that affect how
easily stability can be achieved at every given level of openness.
Bremmer's key observation is that, for a state to transition from one side
of this curve to the other, it must traverse a span of major political instability.
For closed states, the costs related to this period severely tax leaders' political
capital and encourage them to seek more immediate security by retreating up
the steeper left side of the curve. Economic shocks aggravate this trend by
increasing the costs of opening, while windfalls can help alleviate it by
providing leaders with additional resources.
This logic informs Bremmer's main policy critique regarding the
counterproductiveness of targeting autocracies with economic sanctions,
political isolation, and threats of regime change. He notes that these policies
only create a destabilizing downward shift in the targeted country's J curve,
justifying the closed conditions in which autocratic regimes thrive. Instead of
isolation, Bremmer argues for engagement: pressure to open from the
international community paired with political and economic support capable
of raising targeted countries' J curves and staving off destabilization.
But Bremmer does not limit himself simply to broad, international
concerns. Through twelve individual case studies he also deconstructs the
challenges facing specific nations and provides recommendations on how they
can best achieve the long-term stability openness promises. Noting the Castro
regime's carefully cultivated economic hegemony over Cuba, he recommends
an end to the U.S. embargo. Because of Russia's successful escape from
economic disaster under Putin's heavy hand, he encourages a leap for fuller
democracy. Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and countless other problem states
receive similar treatment and prescriptions that match the unique challenges
they face.
These case studies are both the strength of Bremmer's work and the
clearest indicator of its weakness. Each ably synthesizes and addresses the
conditions facing each country and provides pragmatic and reasonable policy
prescriptions. But aside from scattered, largely superficial references to curves
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shifting this way or that, none are particularly tied to the theory that is
supposedly at the core of the book.
The problem lies in Bremmer's overly broad independent variable,
openness. Through it, he represents freedom of information, economic
liberalization, civil rights, education reform, democratization, and other quite
distinct phenomena. While his model would imply that these are all
effectively interchangeable in their relationship with stability, Bremmer
himself admits this is not the case, noting, for instance, that "political
openness is a better guarantor of long-term stability than economic openness"
(p. 259).
Throughout his case studies, Bremmer finds himself having to
differentiate between these different forms of openness. When dealing with
Saudi Arabia, for example, he promotes a policy of "education first-then
democratization," fearing that sudden political openness would only lead to a
more closed, less stable state, given the Saudi public's limited experience with
popular governance (pp. 122-25). But such nuanced distinctions aren't made
in the J curve model. To put forward the policies he sees as most fit, he must
depart from it, or, at the very least, ignore it.
This same problem handicaps Bremmer in actually explaining why the J
curve takes the shape it does. While the source of stability for autocratic
police states is not hard to discern, he only hints at why openness leads to
greater stability in the long run, noting that "[t]he stability of states on the
right side of the curve depends on institutions," (p. 6) and that "[c]onsolidated
democratic regimes . . . are the most stable of states" (p. 11). A generous
reading might take this to mean that the unpredictability of open states
combines with market pressures to promote effective institutions as a means
of risk management, but Bremmer never goes so far. Developing such
institutions, as well as those other factors that promote stability, depends on a
complex network of factors including economic and political liberalization,
rule of law, and material resources, that would inevitably cloud his concise
model. Instead of fully incorporating these factors into his theory, Bremmer
chooses to merely aggregate them into irrelevance.
This choice limits the efficacy of the J curve theory. Absent a more
nuanced theoretical treatment of the factors actually necessary for stability
(something on par with the policy analyses of his case studies) it can do little
to predict or explain specific political outcomes. At best, it seems suited to a
descriptive role, providing a way of viewing and interpreting political trends
without explaining why given events occur as they do. While not without
value, this is a far cry from the "new way to understand why nations rise and
fall" promised by the book's subtitle.
But perhaps it's enough to satisfy Bremmer's purpose. An accomplished
political scientist, Bremmer is no doubt familiar with the requirements of a
true causal theory. Indeed, he himself avoids labeling the J curve as such,
instead describing it as an "ordering principle" and "a framework with which
to understand the pressures and motivations that guide ... countries' leaders"
(p. 24). Painting his picture with broad strokes may require Bremmer to
sacrifice causal logic, but it does leave ample room in his simple framework
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for discussing what would otherwise be disparate policy proposals. And
perhaps this is precisely what Bremmer was aiming for: a sugar coat of
simplicity for his diverse bundle of ideas, one that would make them more
palatable for their intended audience, general public and elite alike.
By this measure, the proliferation of Bremmer's work alone marks it as a
success. The only danger is that readers will fail to see the limited scope of the
J curve theory for what it is. Using just the J curve, one can't necessarily see
why pushing countries toward open markets, social liberalism, and democracy
can cause problems as long as enough money is expended to keep the country
afloat during instability. Nor can one tell whether a period of instability is
merely "free people ... free to make mistakes" on their way to an open, stable
future, as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld once described looters in Iraq, or signs
of a more enduring crisis. Bremmer himself warns against such radical
interpretations, noting at one point that "[t]he damaging effects of pushing for
comprehensive change in a society that isn't ready for it can last for years" (p.
269). But determining when a society is ready involves factors and variables
that have no place in his theoretical schema, leaving a great deal of room for
dangerous misapplication.
Perhaps the best lesson that can be taken from The J Curve is tied to this
last point and the general difficulty Bremmer faces in building a true causal
theory: that the history of human civilization is a complex, chaotic, and
bloody affair resistant to broad generalizations. Wherever men try to force
history to align with their theories and ideologies, it snaps back with a wave of
unforeseen consequences. Thus, the best way to engage the future is through
slow progressive steps, guiding history by building on the developments and
institutions of the past instead of tearing them down to construct anew.
Though this gradualist view isn't reflected in the J curve itself, Bremmer
embraces it in his commentary and the myriad of pragmatic policies he
advocates for in his case studies. One can only hope that readers don't lose
track of this perspective through the parsimonious sheen Bremmer applies to
it and walk away with yet another flawed theory of political development that
promises more than it can deliver.
Rulers, Guns and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism.
By Jonathan A. Grant. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp.
288. Price: $49.95 (Hardcopy). Reviewed by Nwamaka Ejebe.
In Rulers, Guns and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of
Imperialism, historian Jonathan Grant takes an atypical approach to the arms
trade in the years leading up to the First World War. Eschewing the traditional
focus on the Great Powers, Grant goes beyond Europe to provide a rich and
insightful account of the global arms trade and its consequences from 1860 to
1914. Focusing on a time of rapidly advancing weapons technology and
shifting imperial agendas, Grant meticulously researches what motivated
states to export and import arms.
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Starting with the basic premise that private arms dealers needed foreign
consumers to remain profitable, and nations across the globe sought to
modernize their militaries, Grant interrogates the complicated relationship
between Western European and North American arms exporters, and buyers
in Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, and East Africa. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, which holds that arms manufacturers are the servants of
their states, Grant arrives at the unconventional conclusion that "industrial and
banking interests often found themselves at odds with diplomatic or military-
strategic interest, with the results showing that generally the history of arms
trade did not conform neatly to the diplomatic history of the period" (p. 3).
Drawing on intelligence reports, diplomatic correspondence, and
business documents in addition to region-specific secondary sources, Grant
deals with a wide range of issues in only a few hundred pages. The work as a
whole is divided thematically and geographically with each chapter
highlighting an important aspect of the global arms trade narrative. Grant
focuses first on the weapon modernization efforts in four autocracies-Russia,
the Ottoman Empire, China, and Japan. He explores the motivation of each
nation for armament, as well as their approaches to financing imports,
developing domestic manufacturing capacities, and maintaining relationships
with suppliers. Second, the work explores the nature of the secondhand arms
trade in the Balkans, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, its role in nation-building, and its
relationship to imperialist aspirations. Third, Grant shifts into a discussion of
the nature of diplomacy, political systems, and German and Austrian private
arms sellers in Eastern Europe. Fourth, he offers a comparison of regional
naval races during the dreadnought era in Asia and South America. Finally,
Grant examines the fortunes and the misadventures of the German arms
manufacturer, Krupp, and its main competitors.
With such an expansive coverage of nations and events, Grant's
narrative sometimes seems disjointed as he quickly jumps back and forth
across space and time. Nevertheless, the loss of continuity is an acceptable
price for the insights gained by Grant's global survey and his comparative
historical approach. Grant is most poignant when he draws on the patterns
witnessed in individual nations and offers generalized conclusions on the
nature of the arms business. For example, the counterintuitive politics
associated with arms procurement is a recurring theme in Grant's work. In his
analysis of the dreadnought races in South America and the Eastern
Mediterranean, Grant concludes the races "cast serious doubt on the notion
that democratization reduces armed competition and automatically promotes
peace," noting that "[t]he introduction of even a limited democracy into the
procurement process made possible the employment of naval acquisitions as a
sign of popular will and political leadership, thereby transforming the arms
trade into an arms race" (p. 188).
Grant also explores the nexus between international arms trading and
imperialism. At the end of the nineteenth century, he notes, imperialism
served both as a cause and an effect of the arms trade. The efforts by
European powers to secure colonies in Africa and spheres of influence in Asia
forced some nations to arm themselves against foreign encroachment, while
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the influx of arms convinced others to participate in their own imperialist
projects. Nevertheless, Grant refutes the notion that European powers were
able to effectively leverage arms trading to influence buyer nations. Grant
shows how Ethiopia's emperor, John Menilek, manipulated the Italian
government into selling rifles to Ethiopia. While Italy assumed that the arms
would bring Ethiopia under Italy's sphere of influence, in fact just the
opposite occurred. In 1896, when Italy attempted to invade the country,
Menilek used his army's Italian firepower to defeat the advances.
Grant's historical account also contributes to the contemporary
discussion on arms trading. Today's social scientists use two models to
describe arms races: the action-reaction model and the domestic structure
model. The action-reaction model focuses on the competitive interplay
between states, while the domestic structure model emphasizes the internal
political and economic dynamics of the state. While Grant concedes that both
models are persuasive, he finds them flawed because their "state-centric focus
omits the business dimension from the analysis" (p. 242). As Grant's work
deftly illustrates, with examples from each geographical region covered, the
business dimension is essential to understanding why buyer states chose to
purchase armaments from particular supplier nations. He explains that while
diplomats played a role in promoting arms trading, it was the private firms
who aggressively recruited and secured foreign customers. With, and
sometimes even without, their nation's official support, private arms sellers
developed close relationships with foreign military officers and political
leaders to broker arms deals. Moreover, while ambassadors typically
encouraged arms trades with allied-nations, private firms driven by profit
considerations advocated for arms deals with friends, potential allies, and rival
nations.
As the world's top arms trader to the developing world today, the United
States has a particular interest in understanding the role arms trading plays in
domestic and international fronts. Despite the significant influence it has on
the economies and politics of both exporter and importer nations, the current
arms trade, for the most part, remains shrouded in mystery. Historical works
like Grant's, therefore, are useful guides into this hidden world. Similarities
between Grant's history and the present can easily be drawn. For example,
like their predecessors, today's top manufacturing nations (the United States,
Russia, Britain, Germany, and China) continue to use arms trading to exert
political influence and continue to achieve mixed results. However, these
parallels are limited. In nineteenth-century Ethiopia, arms maintained the
sovereignty and viability of the state; however, in twenty-first-century Africa
the widespread availability of weapons serves as a destabilizing force and the
AK-47 as a symbol of revolution and insurrection. With the exception of his
business dimension prescription, Grant provides no additional insights into
how his work can inform our understanding of current global arms trade
dynamics. In the end, Grant draws a fascinating and compelling story of the
global arms trade in the nineteenth century and leaves it to the social scientist
and policy maker to determine how best to use the lessons of history.
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The Aesthetics of International Law. By Ed Morgan. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2007. Pp. 272. Price: $55.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Jennie Han.
The Aesthetics of International Law opens with the radical claim that
international legal commentary is fundamentally a "fantasized work of art" (p.
5). Ed Morgan, a law professor at the University of Toronto, argues that
understanding this art requires that one examine the "form or language of
legal doctrine" rather than its "particular politics, economics, or morals" (p.
3). Starting with the thesis that the "aesthetic qualities of the law mirror
similar qualities in literature" (p. 29), he identifies in each chapter parallels in
rhythm, structure, or imagery that writers of legal commentary and literature
employ in their respective works. While Morgan successfully identifies
various aesthetic parallels between literary and legal texts, he fails to articulate
how these parallels meaningfully inform international law, ultimately failing
to show that international law is best read as art.
The topics Morgan addresses are wide-ranging. He pairs issues such as
terrorism, war crimes trials, extraterritorial criminal law, extradition and the
death penalty, environmental liability, universal jurisdiction, and the law of
war with a diverse set of literary figures from Edgar Allen Poe to Henrik Ibsen
and Bertolt Brecht, to James Joyce, Mordecai Richler, Vladimir Nabokov, and
Thomas Pynchon. The chapters all follow the same template: chapters entitled
"Kurt Vonnegut: The Law of War" or "Franz Kafka: Extraterritorial Criminal
Law" begin with a paragraph biography of the writer and then proceed to
describe a literary element present in both the novelist's text and a text of
international law.
Morgan's claim is that the aesthetic elements of law and literature
mirror one another, and his method of drawing parallels between the law and
literature is faithful to this image. However, this methodological faithfulness
is counterproductive, if not fatal. It is never clear, for instance, how comparing
Ibsen's invitation to the audience to identify with the "setting, characters, and
drama" of the play to Brecht's theory of theatrical distance and emotional
detachment (p. 18) supports or strengthens his conclusions about the
Eichmann trial. Morgan describes the trial as "not (only) a vindication of six
million lives lost, but a celebration of Jewish sovereignty at last achieved" (p.
26). This conclusion does, admittedly, express a "dualism" of criminal
vindication and sovereignty. But it is unlikely that the dichotomy of Ibsenian
subjectivism and Brechtian objectivity helps us to identify or understand this
dualism, or that the literary duality mirrors the legal one in anything more than
a superficial way. In the absence of a sustained argument showing that these
dualities stand in an analytically meaningful relationship to one another,
Morgan's claim that an aesthetic reading of international law is the most
illuminating one remains unconvincing.
This analytic lacuna exists in nearly all of his chapters. In the chapter on
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness and the sources of international law,
Morgan draws from the former the lesson, "true meaning is found in the
opposite of where it would first appear to lie" (p. 30). In a parallel manner,
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international law locates "binding legal authority where the reader was least
expecting it, and where as a consequence the notion of systemic norms is least
vulnerable to a skeptical attack" (p. 31). This conclusion about the sources of
international law is itself quite interesting. But Morgan makes it less so in his
attempt to appropriate it as "aesthetic" with a tenuous analytical connection to
Conrad's notion of unexpected discovery. Ignoring the theoretical and
historical issues implicated in his statement about legal authority in favor of
emphasizing the aesthetic connection, Morgan undermines his own insight
about the sources of international law.
Morgan's chapter on Edgar Allen Poe and terrorism is especially timely
with respect to international law and politics. He argues that in reading Poe's
gothic tales, one sees the "hallmark of terror" not as pain and violence, but
rather "the transfer of violence from the land of adventure to the reader's own
vulnerable and unstable state of mind" (p. 7). Poe's stories are terroristic
because "the horror of the tale is turned inward on the reader, who is
personally touched by . . . disintegration" (p. 8) (internal quotations omitted).
Similarly, terrorism "strikes... the law's own stability as law" (p. 9), forcing
it into a state of "self-mutilation" as it abandons the "deductive reasoning and
linear analysis" that is its source of pride (p. 15). However, Morgan's
subsequent analysis fails to support this conclusion about the effect of
terrorism on the law. He devotes this short chapter to describing how the
narrator in Poe's story, The Man Who Was Used Up, and the judges in Ahmad
v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), are "distracted" in their
respective quests for the truth, the former in his search to uncover the mystery
of General A.B.C. Smith, and the latter in their attempt to define terrorism.
Just as the narrator's interviews turn up conflicting and tangential stories
about the General in Poe's story, each of the judges' attempts in Ahmad to
define terror "contains an allusion to another doctrine in another branch of
legal literature" (p. 14). The court's opinion does move between "level[s] of
legality," with "international law mov[ing] to the domestic and domestic law
mov[ing] to the international" (p. 14). But this "circularity" hardly seems to
prove that the law is "overburdened, and therefore exhausted, by the
impossibility of meaningful discourse on the subject" (p.14), or that the law
reflects Poe's terror. It is equally likely that terrorism, by its nature, lies in
some liminal space between the international and domestic and that the
court's discussion reflects this fact. To conflate international law's project to
develop a language to describe terrorism with the law's being "used up" (p.
15) makes an assumption about its historical and innate "stability" that is
simply untrue.
Morgan's unwillingness to find aesthetic connections beyond the texts
presents yet another problem. Applied only to judges' inability to describe a
phenomenon with a stable set of doctrines, the internalized horror and self-
mutilation of Poe's gothic terror no longer seem so horrifying. Unproductive
as it may be, to call legal circularity terrorism tames the term to the point of
meaninglessness. In contrast, Poe's gothic tale may be a revealing lens
through which to interpret the political and social world that experiences
terrorism. But Morgan's strict commitment to drawing parallels from
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literature to legal text forecloses the possibility of exploring these
connections. Understanding the effects of terrorism on the law and legal
institutions may be served quite well by aesthetics, but an aesthetic reading of
the world and not just of legal texts.
The Aesthetics of International Law contains some fascinating insights
into the law, its history, and its purposes. For example, Morgan hypothesizes
that war crimes trials are not simply a means of punishing offenders, but
rather a "mode of theatre, seeking a truthful account from the players, but
staged in a mode that is carefully circumscribed by convention" (p. 18). This
redefinition challenges the perception of legal and political scholars that war
trials are useless because they fail adequately to punish perpetrators. Morgan
is an impressive interdisciplinary scholar, and his discussions of the
theoretical, historical, and psychological elements of legal writing are
engaging. In fact, his discussion of literature and law pales in comparison.
Morgan's statement about the indispensability of literature for understanding
the law would be much more compelling if he had been less ambitious about
establishing aesthetic connections where they likely do not exist. Where the
connections are most direct, such as his chapter on the theater of war crimes
trials and his section on T.S. Eliot's modernist response to the historicism of
knowledge and meaning and law's relationship to its own history and context,
Morgan's writing is the most convincing and interesting.
While Morgan's analysis fails to support his conclusions about
international law, these conclusions are novel and interesting enough to
validate a message that runs throughout the book: legal scholars should read
more nonlegal literature. A familiarity with various literary devices and an
understanding of how authors create meaning through language can sensitize
scholars to unexpected readings of the law. But then what legal scholars need
from Morgan is not a cursory survey of international legal issues placed
alongside a survey of literary texts, but a sustained, deep analysis of literature
and the aesthetic elements of legal writing so that readers might themselves
acquire the openness of vision that comes with the literary and aesthetic
perspective.
The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs. By Michael D. Ramsey.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp. ix, 492. Price: $65.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Becky Perry.
With his provocative book, The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs,
University of San Diego law professor Michael Ramsey posits a historical
answer to the diverse set of constitutional problems in modern foreign policy.
Ramsey examines disputes over the role of the President and Congress, the
power to enter armed conflict, and the domestic force of international law, in
each case deriving insightful solutions from the words, structure, and context
of the Constitution.
Despite the immediate relevance to post-9/11 debates about executive
war power, few scholars have attempted a comprehensive treatment of foreign
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affairs as a work of constitutional theory. Ramsey steps into this gap with a
premise designed to challenge conventional wisdom about the coherence of
the Constitution. On the first page of the book, he acknowledges that the
luminaries of his field-including Louis Henkin and Harold Koh-embrace
the prevailing belief that the text of the Constitution is fundamentally
incomplete regarding the distribution of power over foreign affairs. In
response to such claims, Ramsey argues that "we have too quickly given up
on the Constitution's text" as the source of a basic but balanced structure for
foreign affairs power (p. 2). This book, he says, is an attempt to rediscover
that constitutional structure.
Conscious of the potentially controversial nature of his argument,
Ramsey carefully distinguishes his approach to constitutional interpretation
from other constitutional theories. In an online symposium promoting the
book's release, Ramsey explicitly rejected both literalism and originalism,
taking pains to distance himself from any perceived political implications of
his work. Instead, he embraces "historical textualism," defined as a focus on
the text of the Constitution, with special attention to the way its words and
phrases were used before and after ratification.
After sketching his proposed methodology, Ramsey applies this
interpretive framework to locate the foreign affairs power within the
Constitution. He first rejects the notion of an inherent foreign affairs power,
arguing that such an appeal contradicts the plain meaning of the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves non-delegated powers to the states. But rather
than label the Constitution "fatally indeterminate" in foreign affairs, Ramsey
argues that the traditional meaning of "executive power" in Article II can fill
the apparent gaps (p. 377). According to Ramsey, the eighteenth-century
definition of executive power included power over foreign affairs, as well as
the conventional power to execute the law. Thus, Article l, Section 1 ("The
executive power shall be vested in a President . . . .") becomes a substantive
grant of power rather than a purely formalistic introductory phrase.
Ramsey's argument is persuasive with regard to the executive powers of
diplomacy and communication. His explanation offers a textual basis-in
Article II, Section 1-for the diplomatic role of the President, without which
the Constitution "would seem to leave a substantial block of power
unallocated" (pp. 70-71). His argument about executive war power, however,
poses greater textual difficulty because the Constitution transfers significant
elements of war power away from the President. The Constitution gives the
powers to declare war, approve treaties, raise and support armies, make rules
concerning captures, call out the militia, impose trade sanctions, and punish
offenses against the law of nations all to the Congress. Ramsey argues that
these transfers of executive war power are exceptional and must be strictly
construed, while the remaining executive power is reserved to the President
through Article II, Section 1.
In this respect, Ramsey appears to neglect the full implications of his
textual approach. Minus the Commander-in-Chief Clause and treaty power,
the Constitution grants most substantive war-related power to the Congress,
not to the President. Given the Article I location of the Necessary and Proper
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Clause, Ramsey's premises could well yield the opposite conclusion-that
war powers are congressional unless explicitly vested in the President.1 Thus,
while historical textualism provides a satisfying explanation for traditional
presidential powers, such as the diplomatic role of the executive, Ramsey
struggles to consistently resolve contemporary questions about the
constitutional allocation of war power.
Despite these lingering issues of application, Ramsey's method yields
results that defy the boundaries of traditional political parties. Some of his
doctrinal arguments would undoubtedly alienate political liberals. Under
Ramsey's account of the Constitution, for example, the President would have
power to fight undeclared defensive wars and to terminate treaties without
congressional approval, while the powers of the states would not be
constrained by international law.2 But other outcomes of Ramsey's historical
textualist approach would equally estrange political conservatives. The
President's executive power in foreign affairs would have to be tied to a
particular treaty or statute-precluding most unilateral executive action-
while the courts would maintain a substantive role in foreign affairs law.
3
Thus, Ramsey maintains his claim to political neutrality by successfully
eluding partisan stereotypes.
In the structural picture that emerges, the Constitution grants important
foreign affairs powers to the executive, but reserves a ballast of independent
powers for the Congress. To Ramsey, this prudent separation is the
consequence of a founding generation deeply concerned about the state of
post-colonial foreign affairs. Given the international problems that plagued the
impotent Articles of Confederation, Ramsey argues, "it seems most unlikely
that the founding-era Americans simply forgot to provide a foreign affairs
framework for their new government" (p. 2). More likely, he posits, the
founders chose to employ the same strategy of checks and balances that
characterizes the rest of the Constitution, thereby creating multiple and
independent centers of foreign affairs power.
To critics, Ramsey's case is an oversell, premised on a historical record
rife with ambiguity. Does the existence of historical disagreement about the
definition of executive power preclude the type of certainty Ramsey's analysis
requires? Is constitutional history simply too messy to permit accurate
judgments about original meaning? To deflect such skeptical questions,
Ramsey inserts a brief but important caveat into his argument, disavowing any
normative implications that might be derived from the book. According to
Ramsey, his is a purely descriptive project, designed to identify-not to
mandate-the historical foreign affairs structure of the Constitution: "I do not
mean to enter into the complex debates over the proper grounding of modem
constitutional law," he says (p. 2). While the disclaimer cleverly shields him
from criticism, Ramsey cannot (and should not) so blithely opt out of the
modem constitutional debate. His careful and even-handed scholarship
I. Andrew Kent, The President's Residual Power to Use Military Force, OPINIO JURIS, Aug.
1, 2007, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/I 185968671 .shtml.
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demonstrates that he is fully capable of addressing not only the descriptive
content of the Constitution, but also the normative implications of that content
for current constitutional questions.
In the end, the persuasive value of The Constitution's Text in Foreign
Affairs turns on the truth of Ramsey's core claim about the coherence of the
Constitution. To some historians, such a commitment embodies the "aesthetic
fallacy ' 4 of infatuation with the elegance and clarity of a merely political
document. To Ramsey, coherence is the logical product of the intellect of the
framers and the weight of the constitutional moment.
Extraordinary Justice: Military Tribunals in Historical and International
Context. By Peter Judson Richards. New York: New York University
Press, 2007. Pp. 267. Price $45.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Danny
Habib.
That Peter Judson Richards has great confidence in the efficacy and
fairness of military tribunals and a corresponding impatience with civil
libertarian critics emerges only gradually and subtly from his book,
Extraordinary Justice: Military Tribunals in Historical and International
Context. Not until quite near the conclusion does Richards let slip the full
measure of his exasperation. In explaining Alexander Hamilton's support for a
death sentence handed down by a Revolutionary War military court to an
army major found guilty of treason, Richards observes that Hamilton, an
artillery captain as well as a trial lawyer, "was not assessing the facts at an
abstract distance, from the peaceful groves of an academy rendered safe by
other men's blood, but as an officer charged with defending and protecting
lives in a perilous war" (pp. 177-78).
Blood and peril, the exigencies of war, states of emergency, catastrophic
threats: all these permeate Richards's survey of military tribunals over the past
two centuries, from the Mexican-American War to the War on Terror.
Richards finds legal justification for "these courts-in-extremity" (p. 3)
primarily in the crisis conditions that prompt their creation and believes that
these extraordinary mechanisms remain legitimate only to the extent that war
has closed the civilian courts, caused them to malfunction, or requires
functions (processing combatant defendants quickly, protecting classified
information, judging violations of the laws of war) beyond their competence.
At the end of this historical trajectory, Richard considers the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, deployed now as ever, in
response to a national security crisis. In his view, only the misplaced concerns
of libertarians and the improper intervention of the federal judiciary have
retarded the tribunals' efforts: while "America and its Western allies wrangle
over the sufficiency of procedural and substantive safeguards for the trial and
treatment of enemy detainees .... illegally organized non-state underground
actors take captive American and allied troops ...and then execute them
without trial" (p. 163). This is a seductive argument and it describes a danger
4. Id.
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that infects all extrajudicial tribunals, none more so than Guantanamo's: when
many and indeterminate dangers loom, and when the alternative is the
deliberate machinery of the civilian system with its panoply of procedural
safeguards for unsympathetic defendants bent on doing lethal harm, tribunals
seem an attractive alternative.
Extraordinary Justice is arranged as "a series of discrete, modem
examples-from the American Civil War, the Second Boer War, the First
World War and the Second World War" (p. 7), and the tendency of tribunals
to expand beyond their original jurisdictional boundaries is evident from the
start. In the Civil War, military commissions were administered under martial
law, principally in the anarchic border territory of Missouri. They arose in
response to guerrilla-type violence (bridge burning, destroying train tracks)
wrought by non-uniformed Confederate partisans and were "a means of
providing a modicum of stability in the midst of appalling brutality and civil
disorder" (p. 28). Richards sees mitigation for their summary character in the
mandatory, if minimal, procedures that accompanied them: they kept written
records, superior military and civilian officials used those records as the basis
for review and discretionary grants of clemency, and capital sentences
required presidential approval. Yet the commissions were soon used
elsewhere and persisted into Reconstruction, when southern states under
martial law saw their civilian courts, often unwilling to apply race-blind
justice, supplanted by the Army's. Enthusiastic about the latter application "as
an important instrument . . . for regulating volatile racial tensions in areas
under the army's jurisdiction" and "a significant interim measure for obtaining
decently fair, impartial conditions for administering justice at a time when
such commodities were in short supply" (p. 43), Richards quiets concerns
about the extended duration of military process by broadening the conceptual
sweep of crisis conditions.
Richards distinguishes between peacetime civilian justice, which has
inherent value as a guarantor of parties' rights, and purely instrumental
wartime adjudication, a tool of the military commander. The distinction
originates in Abraham Lincoln's familiar claim that liberty presupposes
national security. Richards paraphrases Lincoln's Coming Letter: "Once the
dangers of bloody internecine war had been safely negotiated, the blessings of
civil liberties could be duly chartered, but to absolutize the nature of the
protections was to ignore the very real preconditions of military and political
security that alone could give such liberties a chance of survival" (p. 34).
Absolute assurance of due process simply does not comport with military
necessity, Richards argues, and wartime tribunals should be measured not
against an abstract standard, but in the context of the strategic choices faced
by battlefield commanders: "The yardstick of procedural correctness simply
fails to provide a sufficient index of the worth and value of a given
proceeding, as an historical phenomenon taking place within, and itself
shaping, the unfolding international political and military matrix" (p. 175).
Hence, the permissiveness with which Richards regards tribunals' procedural
defects: the right to a jury trial pales in comparison to the need for rapid
disposition of cases and the conservation of military resources, the right to
2008]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:275
confront inculpatory evidence falls when set against the state's interest in
secrecy. To provide a concrete illustration, Richards points to the criminal
trial of the Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombers, during which the United
States put the al Qaeda training manual into evidence, which may have
allowed al Qaeda to change its operational practices in response.
It is precisely this decoupling of military tribunals from an anterior value
system and their evaluation on a flatly instrumental basis that allows their
expansion beyond the battlefield. Richards adduces efficiency justifications
for the endurance of the French conseils de guerre of World War I well into
the armistice period in the occupied German Rhineland, and for the war
crimes prosecutions after World War II. The immense volume of cases on the
docket dictated streamlined, speedy procedures, and military personnel in the
field "were often the only practicable agencies for the investigation, discovery
and, in many cases, adjudication of war crimes" (p. 113). A chapter on the
Boer War-of particular contemporary pertinence because it devolved into a
protracted counterinsurgency struggle with frontlines at once everywhere and
nowhere-discloses the slipperiness of such an approach. Faced with the
prospect of resistance in the Cape Colony, relatively peaceful but considered
vulnerable, the British Army created military courts beset with "occasional
injustice, administrative deficiencies and arbitrariness in the process" (p. 55).
Because "a new reality of armed conflict [was] its expanding, shifting spatial
and temporal boundaries" (p. 51), amplified powers were wielded over a
wider area. "[T]here had to be an element of positive, preemptive power
attached to . . . emergency response. This required greater elasticity in
assessing the geographical limits of the area circumscribed by necessity" (p.
69). The book's broadest claim here emerges: that military authorities (or the
civilian commander-in-chief) should be left significant latitude to determine
the theater of war, to prescribe preemptive measures necessary to protect
national security, and to construe the state of emergency as lasting perhaps
indefinitely.
The specter of a sprawling, endless state of emergency haunts the rough
military justice now administered at Guantanamo. Richards sees asymmetric
conflict with an irregular enemy that does not consider itself bound by the
laws of war and wonders at the solicitude shown for the detainees by federal
judges: "[T]he characteristic judicial focus on private, individual claims of
right ill suits members of the judiciary to levels of oversight that have direct
bearing on the tactical and strategic dimensions of military decision-making in
war" (p. 160).
But the Combatant Status Review Tribunals' significant deviations from
the civilian standard-the admissibility of hearsay and coerced evidence, the
government's power to withhold classified evidence, the presumption in favor
of the accuracy of the government's case-result in a meager approximation
of justice. Richards's reply to this argument is that the Constitution does not
protect unlawful enemy combatants, and moreover, that the United States does
not owe them anything like a trial process, since they, our enemies, do not
reciprocate. A belief that procedure guards the rights of parties in jeopardy
rejects a reciprocity test, however; the United States designs adjudicatory
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processes based on its own values, not those of a terrorist enemy. But even
accepting Richards's instrumental evaluation of military tribunals, he misses
at least one crucial variable: at Guantanamo, it is often the detainees' very
classification as unlawful combatants that is itself at issue, a difficulty that
previous military commissions dealing with uniformed, regular soldiers have
not confronted.
Richards's ultimate ambition, which could be described as, "to wrest the
supervision of the conduct of war away from judges, and put it back with the
political branches," (p. 160) threatens to mothball civilian justice in
potentially limitless ways. Richards makes no attempt to provide for a sunset
to the tribunal system, nor restrain the executive's power to define it. War of
open-ended duration, with battlefields as plausibly found in American airports
as in Afghanistan, may permit military commissions to become normative. Put
another way, how long before extraordinary justice becomes merely ordinary?
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. By Tim Weiner. New York:
Doubleday, 2007. Pp. 671. Price: $27.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Elbridge A. Colby.*
Apparently it is still considered news that the CIA is neither omniscient
nor omnipotent. Tim Weiner, a veteran reporter on intelligence for The New
York Times, gamely states this point in the introduction of his new book,
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, arguing that the United States "has
failed to create a first-rate spy service" and that this "failure constitutes a
danger to the national security of the United States" (p. xiii). Five hundred
pages later, after cataloguing the ups and many downs of the world's most
famous (or infamous) secret service, Weiner concludes that the U.S.
intelligence community, and thus "we Americans[,] still do not understand the
people and the political forces we seek to contain and control" (p. 514). This
is a grave peril, he argues, because "the war in which we are now engaged
may last as long as the Cold War, and we will win or lose by virtue of our
intelligence" (p. 514).
Weiner has been garnering a lot of accolades for his book, perhaps
because it echoes the conventional wisdom-that U.S. intelligence has
"failed." This is a convenient and "punchy" explanation for the depressing
performance of American intelligence agencies over the last sixty years. But it
is also grossly oversimplified and dangerously misleading. American
intelligence, on the whole, has not "failed" so often because of incompetence,
a hard-drinking workforce, or a cavalier attitude, but because of the inherent
difficulty of its task: predicting the future. And predicting the future,
especially when the relevant information is being deliberately hidden, is
* The author worked from 2003 to 2006 in the U.S. intelligence community, including at the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
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notoriously hard. Uncertainty, irreducible complexity, and surprise are built
into the rules of the game.1
Weiner's book is written in a constant tone of appalled contempt for the
CIA's ineptitude, but he might have reached a more realistic picture of the
constraints facing the Agency-and therefore appropriate standards by which
to judge it-if he had applied some basic tools of logical and evidentiary
reasoning. First, Weiner might have applied a good rule for analyzing
organizational performance: if large numbers of reasonably competent people
are failing, the problem is probably systematic. Second, he never
benchmarked the Agency's performance against its peers. If he had done so,
he would have seen that the intelligence services of Britain, France, Germany,
and even the vaunted Soviet Union, were all also "failures" when measured
against his exacting standards. To name just a few: no intelligence service
correctly understood or predicted Saddam Hussein's policies on weapons of
mass destruction; the legendary Israeli intelligence system was fooled in the
Yom Kippur War of 1973; the Japanese gravely misunderstood the American
reaction to their attack in 1941. No intelligence agency has managed to tame
the untamable problem of "anticipating surprise."
Further, Weiner doesn't factor in the difficulties presented by the CIA's
targets: the world's most closed, totalitarian regimes. He chastises the Agency
for not knowing more about the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War and
gives it little credit for signal triumphs such as obtaining Khurschev's 1956
speech disavowing Stalin. He makes little allowance for the fact that the
Soviet Union was a police state organized to prevent the release of
information that had readily murdered millions of its citizens on the
(fabricated) grounds that they were spies. The Soviets created whole secret
cities for their strategic and space programs. Weiner at one point quotes an
Agency Soviet expert stating that the CIA would have needed to "recruit a
member of the Politburo" to get what was required. Needless to say, the
chances of recruiting a member of the Soviet inner sanctum of power were
low. Nor is the Soviet Union unique: the key intelligence targets of the United
States tend to be closed, totalitarian societies paranoid about security, and a
fair judge of the Agency's performance needs to take this reality into account.
Even when Weiner concedes that the Agency was successful, he tends to
cast it as a malevolent actor. The Agency, it seems, can do no right. In
discussing the CIA's successful covert political actions in Italy, France,
Germany, Japan, Iran, Guatemala, the Philippines, and elsewhere, he takes the
Agency to task for undermining national self-determination and being
complicit with authoritarian governments. But if the Agency's purpose was to
combat Soviet communist influence globally, and if, as the Doolittle Report of
1954 (a report that Weiner cites approvingly) recommended, the United States
would have to adopt methods previously forsworn, then the grim means used
in these countries should weigh in the Agency's favor, at least when
calculating effectiveness. It is hardly fair to take the Agency to the woodhouse
1. For a fuller explication of the author's views on this subject, see Elbridge A. Colby,
"Making Intelligence Smart," 144 POL'Y REv. 71 (2007), available at http://www.hoover.org/
publications/policyreview/8817787.html.
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for ineffectiveness and then to discount successes because they were won
using unpalatable means.
This tension between calling for both effectiveness and for purity
illuminates a major contradiction in much current criticism of the U.S.
intelligence community, which calls for both a more effective and a purer
intelligence community. The disappointing catalog that Weiner presents
should teach us that such a convenient mix is not an option.2 The Agency has
never been all that effective when measured against Weiner's implausibly
exacting standards, and, when it has been effective, success has often
stemmed from ways and means its critics find distasteful.
So what inferences should be drawn from the CIA's historical record?
Weiner seems to think that a redoubling of efforts by better, smarter, or more
culturally-attuned people at the CIA will do the trick. But is there any real
reason to think that previous generations of CIA officers were especially
incompetent or malevolent? The sample's size, variability, and length should
rebut that notion. A more appropriate inference would be that the problematic
variable is not the quality of the troops, but rather some combination of the
inherent limitations of intelligence and the methods employed. And while the
first of these obstacles is insurmountable, it seems unlikely that Weiner wants
to go down the path of the second, which would seem to call for the very
methods that he deplores. If he is unwilling to embrace these tactics, he should
be far more charitable to the CIA, which must operate within severe
constraints.
In foreign policy, knowing a little is better than knowing nothing. Still,
the deeper inference to draw is that intelligence is starkly limited in what it
can promise and that the chances of surprise can be lessened but never blotted
out entirely. This would suggest that we not rely too much upon
intelligence-important as its role may be-to ensure our security. Despite
Weiner's claim that the war on terror will be won or lost based on the
performance of our intelligence services, the U.S. government knows that
intelligence is not as central to our national security as some seem to think,
which is why the low quality of American intelligence so often bemoaned by
U.S. presidents has rarely, if ever, affected our basic security. The reason for
this is that America's safety rests on firmer grounds-especially the ground of
the credible threat of force. But making this threat of force credible, effective,
and successful is a difficult task and requires our making tough and sometimes
unpalatable tradeoffs. Intelligence will play only a supporting, if
indispensable, role in this effort. Thus, Weiner's book, despite its mistaken
gloss, should make clear that vesting our hopes for security primarily in
intelligence would be foolish. But it should also awaken us to the tough but
necessary set of choices that we will need to make as the threat of catastrophic
destruction becomes more and more stark.
2. For a fuller discussion of the necessary tradeoffs between effectiveness and what is here
termed "purity," see RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED Focus, HALTING STEPS
(2007) and RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (2006).
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